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Abstract Entrepreneurs start and grow their ventures in
a widely varying set of institutional contexts. One
differentiator is a country’s regulatory efficiency which
encompasses the freedom to start and to run a business
without excessive government interventions around reg-
istering, hiring, and firing employees, and price controls
on currency. The efficiency of regulations varies sub-
stantially among countries and imposes additional costs
and risks on entrepreneurs’ activities. We integrate in-
sights from institutional theory and recent literature on
gender and entrepreneurship to better understand how a
country’s regulatory efficiency affects male and female
entrepreneurs’ employment growth ambitions. We ex-
plore three aspects of regulatory efficiency: business
freedom (e.g., to start, operate, and close a venture),
labor freedom (e.g., laws around minimum wage, lay-
offs, severance), and monetary freedom (e.g., price sta-
bility) using data from over 47,000 entrepreneurs in 68
countries. We find that entrepreneurs’ growth ambitions
are higher in countries with more efficient regulations,
particularly those countries characterized by fewer labor
law restrictions and greater monetary freedoms. These
findings are further exacerbated by gender by such that,
relative to their female counterparts, male entrepreneurs
have significantly greater venture growth ambitions.
Our paper contributes to the discussion on how formal
institutions influence women and men entrepreneurs in
distinct ways.
Keywords Female entrepreneurship . Formal
institutions . Growth ambitions . Global
EntrepreneurshipMonitor . Economic freedom
indicators
JEL classifications J16 . L26 . L25
1 Introduction
One of the world’s fastest growing entrepreneurial
populations is women-led new and small businesses
(Brush et al. 2006; Brush and Cooper 2012) which
number 274 million in 74 countries (Kelley et al.
2017). Compared to males, female entrepreneurs’
growth ambitions remain low (or relatively low)
across countries (Davis and Shaver 2012; Jennings
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and Brush 2013; Devine et al. 2019; Hechavarria
et al. 2019), potentially leading to a waste of
women’s talents and capabilities (Coleman et al.
2019; Foss et al. 2019). Strikingly, according to
Elam et al. (2019), there is no region in the world
in which women entrepreneurs expect to grow their
ventures more than men, and the gender gap is even
more pronounced when examining entrepreneurs’
high growth expectations. Existing literature high-
lights gender differences in entrepreneurship due to
informal institutions, for example, differential ef-
fects on male and female entrepreneurs’ social net-
works (e.g., Batjargal et al. 2013; Holmes et al.
2013; McAdam et al. 2019). There is a critical gap
in our knowledge around how formal institutions
may lead to differences in growth ambitions be-
tween female and male entrepreneurs (Estrin and
Mickiewicz 2011; Bradley and Klein 2016;
Terjesen et al. 2016; Welter et al. 2017).
Individual-level factors impact organizations, and
these interactions lead to emergent, collective, and
organizational-level outcomes, which may influence
macro-level institutional determinants that lead to gen-
der differences in entrepreneurs’ growth ambitions
(Shepherd et al. 2015; Bjornskov and Foss 2016;
Welter et al. 2017). One overlooked institution that
may explain entrepreneurial behavior is regulatory effi-
ciency. Regulatory efficiency captures a country’s level
of business freedom (to start, operate, and close a busi-
ness), labor freedom (e.g., laws around minimum wage,
layoffs, severance), and monetary freedom (e.g., price
stability). Efficient regulations decrease the costs im-
posed by regulations on entrepreneurs (e.g., legal regis-
tration, licensing, hiring and firing, inflation), thereby
stimulating market entry and competition (North 1990;
Baumol et al. 2007; McMullen et al. 2008; Shleifer
2010). Entrepreneurship research acknowledges the im-
portance of regulatory efficiency to entrepreneurial ac-
tivity, but has not explored gender differences (Estrin
and Mickiewicz 2011; Goltz et al. 2015). We integrate
insights from institutional theory, firm growth, and gen-
der entrepreneurship to explore how labor market insti-
tutions shape female and male entrepreneurs’ employ-
ment growth ambitions.
Our study offers three contributions. First, we re-
spond to recent calls to investigate entrepreneurial di-
versity (e.g., Bjornskov and Foss 2010, 2016; Welter
et al. 2017) by focusing on an important subgroup of
entrepreneurs: female entrepreneurs. In addition to their
contribution to economic growth and poverty reduction,
female entrepreneurs, compared to male entrepreneurs,
are more likely to contribute to their children’s educa-
tion, health, and nutrition (Kelley et al. 2017). Although
women’s entrepreneurship is an important issue from a
policy perspective because there are significant benefits
to encouraging and supporting women entrepreneur-
ship, only 4% of gender and entrepreneurship studies
address public policy (Link and Strong 2016).We tackle
this gap in studies on gender and entrepreneurship by
focusing on the influence of institutions on growth
ambitions of female versus those of male entrepreneurs.
Second, a rich literature utilizes transaction cost eco-
nomics and new institutional economics perspectives
(e.g., Baumol 1990; North 1990; Williamson 1996) to
investigate how macro-level institutional factors may
shape micro-level entrepreneurial behavior (Bowen
and De Clercq 2008; Henrekson and Sanandaji 2011;
Braunerhjelm and Eklund 2014). However, little is
known about what mechanisms link these institutions
to entrepreneurs’ strategic decisions around hiring and
growth (McMullen et al. 2008; Nikolaev et al. 2018;
Chowdhury et al. 2019). We explore the mechanisms of
one-off versus recurring costs imposed by regulations
(Baumol et al. 2007; Darnihamedani et al. 2018) on
gender differences among entrepreneurs (Watson and
Robinson 2003; Alsos et al. 2006; Jennings and Brush
2013) that manifest in dissimilar impacts on employ-
ment growth ambitions of female versus male entrepre-
neurs. Moreover, we theoretically draw on the interplay
of formal and informal institutions to examine the im-
portance of formal institutions, and explain how the
costs imposed by regulations interact with social expec-
tations and perceptions (e.g., women’s less risk taking
propensity and lower levels of social capital than men)
to lead to gender differences in entrepreneurs’ growth
ambitions. We argue that compared to women, regula-
tory efficiency is likely to positively influence male
entrepreneurs’ employment growth ambitions, as males
typically have characteristics (e.g., higher risk propen-
sity) and resources (e.g., extended networks of profes-
sionals and managers in the society) that are more easily
activated by regulatory efficiency. Third, our study ex-
amines policy interventions to increase women’s entre-
preneurship (Arshed et al. 2014), especially given the
ubiquitous nature of many regulations (Shleifer 2010).
An essential step is examining whether formal institu-
tions have differing impacts, and through which mech-
anisms, on female and male entrepreneurs’ growth
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opportunities. Foss et al. (2019, p. 409) report that,
despite an increase in the number of articles offering
policy implications for female entrepreneurship, such
policy implications are “mostly vague, conservative,
and center on identifying skills gaps in women entre-
preneurs that need to be fixed.” Our study shows, po-
tentially due to institutionalized gender gap (Tonoyan
et al. 2020), even with higher levels of regulatory effi-
ciency in a country, the gender gap in entrepreneurs’
employment growth ambitions persists. Interestingly,
with higher levels of regulatory efficiency, the gap is
pronounced, showing that male entrepreneurs are more
likely to benefit from efficient government regulations
compared to female entrepreneurs.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
the theoretical background and develops hypotheses of
this study accordingly. Section 3 explains the data,
measures, and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents
the empirical results that correspond to the hypothesized
relationships. Sections 5 and 6 discuss and conclude our
findings, with implications for policy and practice, and
directions for future research.
2 Theoretical development and hypotheses
2.1 Employment growth ambitions of female versus
male entrepreneurs
A large literature explores gender differences in entrepre-
neurs’ ambitions for their ventures, including employment
growth. A few studies (e.g., Bardasi et al. 2011) report
near-equal growth-oriented female and male-owned busi-
nesses; however, more studies report that early-stage fe-
male entrepreneurs, ceteris paribus, show lower employ-
ment growth ambitions than their male counterparts (e.g.,
Davis and Shaver 2012; Devine et al. 2019). Female
entrepreneurs’ lower employment growth may be driven
by differences not only in terms of individual characteris-
tics but also in terms of contextual factors, including
informal (e.g., social expectations, stereotypes and biases,
norms, cultural dimensions, and roles attributed to women
andmen) and formal (e.g., laws to protect more egalitarian
child care, policies for reducing gender inequality) institu-
tions in which they are embedded.
First, informal institutions may lead female entrepre-
neurs to form low employment growth ambitions com-
pared to male entrepreneurs. Prior studies describe that
certain characteristics more commonly found among
women such as a higher fear of failure and lower risk-
taking propensity result from social expectations and
norms (Sexton and Bowman-Upton 1990; Powell and
Ansic 1997). Additionally, female entrepreneurs face
greater hurdles in attracting resources needed for growth
mainly due to widely held perceptions about women,
and their capabilities and ventures (Brush et al. 2006;
Ahl and Nelson 2015). Women are more likely to be
structurally located in non-managerial and female-
dominated positions, particularly in gender-segregated
environments (Brush et al. 2019; Tonoyan et al. 2020).
Such positions provide opportunities to accumulate
entrepreneurship-specific resources as well as exposure
to entrepreneurial opportunities. Women-led ventures
tend to operate with lower levels of initial financing
(Verheul and Thurik 2001; Fairlie and Robb 2009),
lower levels of debt and equity beyond their nascent
stages (Alsos et al. 2006), and less access to external
financing such as venture capital and business angels
due to investors’ biases among other reasons (Coleman
and Robb 2012; Kanze et al. 2018). Consistent with
these arguments, prior studies suggest that female entre-
preneurs are more likely than male entrepreneurs to
pursue social missions (Verheul et al. 2005;
Hechavarria et al. 2019) and consequently place less
priority on growth and profitability (Davis and Shaver
2012). On the other hand, female entrepreneurs may
have certain characteristics that may prove advanta-
geous for survival and growth such as displaying stricter
ethical codes, more discipline, and less reckless aggres-
sive decisions than male entrepreneurs (Pan and Sparks
2012; van Staveren 2014).
Second, formal institutional arrangements shape not
only the number of women (and men) exploring entrepre-
neurial opportunities andmaking strategic choices, but also
in what ways these women form and realize growth am-
bitions (Brush et al. 2009; Thébaud 2015). We utilize both
economic and management approaches to understanding
how entrepreneurs both operate within controls and adopt
to controls imposed by formal institutions (Cuervo-
Cazurra et al. 2019). That is, from an economics stand-
point, stringent formal institutions limit market exchanges,
and are quite explicit about the laws and regulations, and
high-quality (i.e., market supporting) institutions facilitate
market transactions; from a management standpoint, en-
trepreneurs can analyze, understand, and learn how to
operate within institutional constraints (Cuervo-Cazurra
et al. 2019). In this respect, formal institutions can set the
“rules of the game” in such a way that male entrepreneurs
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have a high (or low) relative rewards for setting high
employment growth ambitions compared to female entre-
preneurs (Baumol 1990; North 1990; Estrin and
Mickiewicz 2011). Through imposing additional risks
and (one-off or recurring) costs, formal institutions may
lead to gender differences in entrepreneurs’ strategic and
growth plans.
While both formal and informal institutions may
distinctly influence entrepreneurs’ aspirations and deci-
sions, their interplay create an environment that shapes
differences in female and male entrepreneurs’ growth
ambitions (North 1990; Williamson 1996; Terjesen
et al. 2016; Bullough et al. 2017). Our theoretical de-
velopment seeks to explain the importance of formal
institutions and examine how the costs imposed by
regulations interact with social expectations and percep-
tions (e.g., women’s less risk-taking propensity and
lower levels of social capital than men) lead to gender
differences in entrepreneurs’ growth ambitions.
2.2 Regulatory efficiency
Policy makers create regulations to endorse entrepre-
neurial entry, improve business growth, reduce fixed
costs, access efficient technology, and lower demand
constraints (Ardagna and Lusardi 2008; Ferraz et al.
2015). From a market efficiency perspective, the exis-
tence of regulations is justified to prevent market failure
and when litigation is expensive, unpredictable, or bi-
ased (Shleifer 2010). Under these conditions, efficient
(and detailed) contracts and (ill-functioning) courts can-
not replace government regulations since, from cost-
efficiency perspectives, contracts achieve less if their
interpretation is unpredictable and their enforcement is
costly (Shleifer 2010). That said, government regula-
tions are designed to achieve the dual role of protecting
society and keeping regulatory costs low. Hence, regu-
lations are efficient when they protect society and citi-
zens (e.g., workplace safety regulations, protection of
vulnerable citizens) while imposing fewer costs and
risks on entrepreneurs and businesses (Hart 2009).
A recent World Bank report explains that of five
factors that can lead to inefficient regulations, three are
relevant to entrepreneurship and growth. First, a lack of
adequate information among actors resulting from poor
governance results in additional costs and waste of time/
efforts among entrepreneurs (World Bank 2017). Sec-
ond, a lack of coordination increases bureaucracy and
red tape that may increase transaction costs to start and
grow a business. Third, complex monitoring systems
may create additional uncertainty and confusion among
entrepreneurs. These three aspects of inefficient regula-
tory frameworks impose additional costs and risks on
(growth-oriented) male and female entrepreneurs.
Regulations are a form of taxation that “make it
difficult for entrepreneurs to create value” (Heritage
Foundation 2008, p. 42). Efficient regulations protect
society and citizens and impose as few costs as possible
on starting and growing new ventures for entrepreneurs
(Baumol et al. 2007; Gwartney et al. 2008; Shleifer
2010). While government regulations comprise various
aspects of (business) activities in a society, regulatory
efficiency describes the freedom to start and to run a
business without excessive government intervention in
the form of business legal registration (i.e., business
freedom); the freedom to start employment and work
where under any kind of conditions and for as long as
that an individual is happy to accept (i.e., labor free-
dom); and a steady currency as a basis for exchange (i.e.,
monetary freedom) (Heritage Foundation 2008;
McMullen et al. 2008; Kuckertz et al. 2016).
Although the raison d’etre of efficient regulations is
reducing the costs imposed on entrepreneurs, we believe
efficient regulations impose little costs on male com-
pared to female entrepreneurs, thereby leading male
entrepreneurs to form higher employment growth am-
bitions. First, with higher levels of regulatory efficiency,
particularly start-up and license costs, government reg-
ulations impose less one-off entry costs on entrepre-
neurs (Darnihamedani et al. 2018; Branstetter et al.
2014). Low entry costs subsequently lead to excessive
entry by imitative and less ambitious entrepreneurs,
particularly among female entrepreneurs due to their
engagement with social missions as well as less access
to resources. Second and considering recurring costs
imposed by regulations, male entrepreneurs have more
access to financial and social capital than female entre-
preneurs (Brush et al. 2004; Alsos et al. 2006). When
regulations impose less (recurring) costs (i.e., higher
levels of labor and monetary freedom), entrepreneurs
will have more resources to set high employment
growth ambitions since the availability of human and
financial resources are related to growth (Penrose 1959;
Heirman and Clarysse 2004; Khaire 2010). Male entre-
preneurs are more likely to set higher employment
growth ambitions than female entrepreneurs with lower
(recurring) costs because, in addition to male entrepre-
neurs’ access to more resources, they are more prone to
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uncalculated risk-taking and overconfidence (Watson
and Robinson 2003; Jennings and Brush 2013). These
two mechanisms suggest that, in a given country, male
and female entrepreneurs do not equally benefit from
efficient regulations. We focus on three pillars of regu-
latory efficiency—business freedom, labor freedom,
monetary freedom—and how each pillar influences
growth ambition of female and male entrepreneurs.
2.3 Business freedom
Business freedom captures the overall government reg-
ulation efficiency of starting, operating, and closing a
business. One-off costs imposed by regulations mainly
deter entry of imitative entrepreneurs and have little to
no influence on entry by innovative and growth-oriented
entrepreneurs (Kaplan et al. 2011; Branstetter et al.
2014) because growth-oriented innovative entrepre-
neurs have high expected returns on their ideas and
enough start-up capital to incur such one-off costs
(Darnihamedani et al. 2018). Higher levels of business
freedom, due to imposing fewer one-off costs on poten-
tial entrepreneurs, stimulate the entry of imitative entre-
preneurs given their lower expected returns on entrepre-
neurship (Kaplan et al. 2011; Rostam-Afschar 2014).
There are two key consequences of entry of imitative
entrepreneurs for market dynamics and entrepreneurs’
employment growth ambitions. First, with the presence
of imitative entrepreneurs, the quality of “average” en-
trepreneurs in the market at least in terms of their em-
ployment growth ambitions decreases mainly because
imitative entrepreneurs have lower employment growth
ambitions than innovative entrepreneurs (Baumol et al.
2007; Parker 2018). Second, while imitative entrepre-
neurs stimulate competition in the product market
(Welter et al. 2017), they simultaneously lower innova-
tive entrepreneurs’ employment growth expectations
due to a lower ability to reap the fruits of innovation
(van Stel et al. 2007; Darnihamedani et al. 2018). Ac-
cording to Schumpeter (1934), entrepreneurs innovate
as they hope for (at least temporarily) monopoly posi-
tion in the market, thereby providing a considerable
profit opportunity. Imitation removes, at least partly,
this opportunity by offering a similar product possibly
with a lower price. Thus, imitation can subsequently
discourage particularly innovative entrepreneurs from
setting high ambitions for their future growth (Stam
and Wennberg 2009). Hence, we propose:
Hypothesis 1a: Higher business freedom decreases
entrepreneurs’ employment growth ambitions.
There are two main reasons why higher levels of busi-
ness freedom in a country will more detrimentally influ-
ence female entrepreneurs’ employment growth ambitions
than male entrepreneurs, related to dissimilar access to
financing and to dissimilar risk-taking propensities, respec-
tively. First, in a high business freedom environment, there
is no or little selection effect such that female (and male)
entrepreneurs with low expected returns for their ventures
(and, hence, low employment growth ambitions) may
decide to start a business (Watson and Robinson 2003;
Darnihamedani et al. 2018). Since female entrepreneurs
have, on average, lower growth ambitions relative to their
male counterparts (Rosenbaum 2017; Pergelova et al.
2019), in the presence of high business freedom, the entry
of female entrepreneurs with low growth ambitions would
be disproportionally higher than those of male entrepre-
neurs with low growth ambitions. This is mainly driven by
female entrepreneurs’ lower access to investment and their
tendency to launch ventures with lower levels of initial
financing than less-ambitious male entrepreneurs (Boden
and Nucci 2000; Alsos et al. 2006).
Second, in countries where formal institutions im-
pose less business costs through business freedom, in-
dividuals with high-risk aversion may be motivated to
start a business due to the lower costs of running and
closing a business (Block and Landgraf 2016; Parker
2018). Female entrepreneurs have lower propensity for
(uncalculated) risk-taking thanmale entrepreneurs (Sex-
ton and Bowman-Upton 1990; Powell and Ansic 1997).
With high levels of business freedom, we can expect
that many potential female entrepreneurs may enter the
market with low risk-taking propensities and, subse-
quently, with low levels of growth ambitions as entre-
preneurial risk-taking is an important driver of growth
ambitions. Taken together, we expect:
Hypothesis 1b: The negative effect of business free-
dom on entrepreneurs’ employment growth ambi-
tions is stronger for female than for male
entrepreneurs.
2.4 Labor freedom
Labor freedom includes various aspects related to the
regulatory framework of a country’s labor market such
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as minimum wages, laws inhibiting layoffs, severance
requirements, and measurable regulatory restraints on
hiring and hours worked (Heritage Foundation 2008).
Stringent labor regulations impose recurring labor costs
on entrepreneurs (Acemoglu 2001; Block et al. 2019),
which negatively influence entrepreneurs’ ability to in-
vest in and to obtain financial and human resources
which are essential to growth planning and ambitions
(Penrose 1959; Heirman and Clarysse 2004; Estrin et al.
2016).
Additionally, a lack of labor freedom can restrict
entrepreneurs’ employment growth ambitions due to
entrepreneurs’ need for labor mobility (Coad et al.
2017; Block et al. 2019). Labor mobility helps entrepre-
neurs and young businesses to acquire essential (human)
resources that are vital for growth (Eisenhardt and
Martin 2000; Teece 2007). Moreover, when labor free-
dom is restricted through, for example, centralized col-
lective bargaining, individuals are deterred from nego-
tiating wages and allocating resources to their most
productive activities (McMullen et al. 2008), subse-
quently limiting entrepreneurs’ planning ability and au-
tonomy to make optimal decisions for their ventures. In
this environment, an entrepreneur cannot take decisions
to maximize the growth opportunities of the venture
even if he/she has high employment growth ambitions
(Mueller and Thomas 2001). In this respect, restricted
labor freedom may impose risks and restrictions on
entrepreneurs’ employment growth ambitions. Thus,
we expect:
Hypothesis 2a: Higher labor freedom increases
entrepreneurs’ employment growth ambitions.
In a given country, there are two reasons why high
levels of labor freedom have a more pronounced posi-
tive effect on male than on female entrepreneurs. First,
since male entrepreneurs are more likely to start ven-
tures with economic missions and high employment
growth ambitions, men tend to have high expected
returns on entrepreneurship (Watson and Robinson
2003; Verheul et al. 2005). In countries with low labor
freedom, labor regulations impose considerable recur-
ring labor costs (e.g., costs of hiring and firing) on
entrepreneurs (Siebert 1997; Holmlund 2014). Male
entrepreneurs are more sensitive to recurring costs im-
posed by regulations since they value economic mis-
sions and expected returns on entrepreneurship more
than female entrepreneurs. Stringent regulations remove
some of the expected “prize” of innovation and growth,
particularly for male entrepreneurs.
Moreover, male entrepreneurs are more likely than
female entrepreneurs to reap the fruits of labor mobility
in a country with high labor freedom. One reason is that
male entrepreneurs have, on average, more extensive
networks of technical professionals and managers since
the majority of professionals and managers are males,
particularly in high-tech sectors with growth opportuni-
ties (Verheul and Thurik 2001; Devine et al. 2019).
Females’ social networks are less likely to overlap with
technical professionals and managers (Devine et al.
2019). With labor mobility in a country, male entrepre-
neurs are more likely to acquire key human resources
due to their social capital such as networks of managers
and professionals. Another reason is that females tend to
demonstrate more agreeableness (Vecchione et al.
2012), empathy, and cooperativeness rather than com-
petition and aggression in the work environment and as
entrepreneurs (Mainiero and Sullivan 2005). With high
levels of labor mobility, which means rather effortless
firing and hiring of individuals, these traits could im-
pede female entrepreneurs’ efforts to find and hire hu-
man capital as well as to fire employees who do not fit
the venture goals and culture. In sum, when a country’s
institutions facilitate greater labor mobility, male entre-
preneurs are best positioned to benefit by acquiring
critical human capital required for growth:
Hypothesis 2b: The positive effect of labor freedom
on entrepreneurs’ employment growth ambitions is
weaker for female than for male entrepreneurs.
2.5 Monetary freedom
Monetary freedom refers to price stability (i.e., inflation)
and price control in a country (Friedman 1962; 1977).
Higher values of monetary freedom can be achieved
with little to no price control and a low rate of inflation
(Heritage Foundation 2008). Inflation increases the
costs of obtaining resources for entrepreneurs since a
high inflation rate means high prices for resources such
as technological, human, and financial resources
(McMullen et al. 2008). Additionally, the concept and
measurement of sound money is linked with a country’s
level of financial development and is an indicator of
access to capital (Bjornskov and Foss 2010). Citizens’
(including entrepreneurs’) sound access to stable and
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predictable money can improve their access to external
capital since investors are able to engage andmake long-
term calculations of the venture valuation (Bjornskov
and Foss 2010; Kuckertz et al. 2016).
Through distorting prices, inflation imposes addi-
tional risks on entrepreneurs as it would be difficult for
entrepreneurs to determine whether (and when) reve-
nues exceed costs (DiLorenzo 2004). In this respect,
entrepreneurs cannot precisely calculate the future mar-
ket prices of their resources and are unable to make
long-term growth plans since erratic inflation often
“jams” the signaling effect of relative prices (Friedman
1977; Díaz-Casero et al. 2012). This effect is shown in
prior studies such as Bjornskov and Foss (2010) and
Nikolaev et al. (2018) who find strong positive effects of
monetary freedom on opportunity entrepreneurship.
Such additional risks caused by a lack of sound money
in a country can deter the entry and survival of growth-
oriented entrepreneurs. Based on the above, we expect:
Hypothesis 3a: Higher monetary freedom in-
creases entrepreneurs’ employment growth
ambitions.
Given male entrepreneurs’ disproportional access to
capital (Jennings and Brush 2013), these men are more
likely to benefit from a country’s access to soundmoney
and lower rates of inflation. Although recent studies
show that female entrepreneurs have certain advantages
in managing venture capital, taking more calculated
risks, and forming more productive relationships with
investors (van Staveren 2014; Devine et al. 2019), male
entrepreneurs have greater access to external sources
such as venture capital and debt finance (Boden and
Nucci 2000; Alsos et al. 2006). With higher levels of
monetary freedom in a country, external financing is
more widely available, particularly to male entrepre-
neurs (Becker-Blease and Sohl 2007; Coleman and
Robb 2012; Jennings and Brush 2013).
Prior studies suggest that female entrepreneurs are
more adept at making careful risk calculations for their
ventures (Watson and Robinson 2003; van Staveren
2014). Low levels of monetary freedom distort prices
of goods and services, making it more difficult for
entrepreneurs to meticulously calculate business risks
and make growth plans. Higher levels of monetary
freedom predominantly help male entrepreneurs to set
high employment growth ambitions compared to their
female counterparts. Hence, we propose:
Hypothesis 3b: The positive effect of monetary free-
dom on employment growth ambitions of entrepre-
neurs is weaker for female than for male
entrepreneurs.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Data collection and variables
We utilize two datasets to investigate the relationship
between regulatory efficiency factors and employment
growth ambitions of male and female entrepreneurs. At
the individual level, we use the Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor (GEM) annual adult population survey, totaling
68 countries and 47,386 (early-stage) entrepreneurs
from 2006 to 2013. The list of countries and the sample
size per country can be found in the Online Appendix
(Table A1). GEM is the world’s leading entrepreneur-
ship study and collects data and insights on entrepre-
neurs’ human capital, attitudes, decisions, and employ-
ment growth ambitions (Reynolds et al. 2005). At the
country level, we use Heritage Foundation data on the
regulatory efficiency variables of business freedom, la-
bor freedom, and monetary freedom, in line with recent
entrepreneurship studies of economic freedom
(McMullen et al. 2008; Valdez and Richardson 2013;
Bradley and Klein 2016; Kuckertz et al. 2016).
The dependent variable, entrepreneurs’ employment
growth ambitions, is measured by an entrepreneur’s
expected job growth (employees) in 5 years. Mainly
due to skewness of the data, we use a log-transformed
version of the variable consistent with Hessels et al.
(2008), Levie and Autio (2011), and Efendic et al.
(2015). We measure the independent variables of busi-
ness, labor, and monetary freedom with scores based on
a myriad of factors. We incorporate a range of controls
at country (e.g., GDP per capita, GDP growth rate,
population) and individual (entrepreneur’s current firm
size by employees, university education, fear of failure,
and age) levels. Table 1 details the variables’ definition,
measurement, data sources, and justification.
3.2 Empirical strategy
Consistent with prior research, we employ multi-level
linear regressions with random intercepts at two levels:
individual and country (Peterson et al. 2012; Stephan
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et al. 2015; Boudreaux et al. 2019). As entrepreneurs are
nested in countries, multi-level regressions are designed to
combine variables from several aggregation levels and
reduce the likelihood of type 1 and type 2 errors by
considering possible intra-class correlations (Hofmann
et al. 2000). Multi-level models estimate variances of the
random effects and use this information to give different
weights to observations. Thus, multi-level models not only
correct the standard errors, but also provide better estima-
tions of coefficients.
Additionally, intra-class correlations (ICCs) deter-
mine that level 1 observations differ significantly from
level 2 groups (Peterson et al. 2012). Existing literature
applies various ICC cutoff points from 15 (Stephan et al.
2015) to 9.3% (Boudreaux et al. 2019). Heck et al.
(2010, p. 74) argue that “… if the ICC is quite small
(i.e., researchers often use 0.05 as a rough ‘cut-off’
point), then there would be little advantage to
conducting multi-level analysis.” For our dependent
variable of entrepreneurs’ expected job growth,
country-level ICC is around 7.5%, providing the condi-
tions to conduct multi-level regressions.
4 Results
As shown in Table 2, entrepreneurs currently create
around 5 jobs and expect to provide 14 jobs in the next
5 years. Our sample is nearly equally split by gender:
54% male and 46% female. Some 42% of entrepreneurs
attain some levels of university education and 41%
report a fear of failure. At the country level, the average
score of (lagged) business freedom, (lagged) labor free-
dom, and (lagged) monetary freedom are 66.4%, 62.7%,
and 74.2% respectively. Moreover, the average (log)
GDP per capita and GDP growth rate are 9.5 and
2.25%. Looking at Table 2 correlations at the individual
level, most are insignificant and low (below 0.2). At the
country level, the correlations are higher for the main
predictors, but never above 0.5. Taken together, multi-
collinearity is not a concern in this study.
Table 3 model I shows that at the individual level, the
current number of created jobs and high education has a
significant positive relationship with entrepreneurs’ em-
ployment growth ambitions. Entrepreneurs’ employ-
ment growth ambitions have a significant negative rela-
tionship with fear of failure, but no relationship to age.
At the country level, entrepreneurs’ employment growth
ambitions have a significant negative relationship with
GDP growth, but no relationship with a country’s GDP
per capita (log) and population (log).
Table 3 model II shows the direct effects of the three
regulatory efficiency independent variables on entrepre-
neurs’ employment growth ambitions. Employment
growth ambitions have a significant negative relationship
with lagged business freedom and a significant positive
relationship with lagged labor freedom and lagged mone-
tary freedom. These findings support hypotheses 1a, 2a,
and 3a. However, when we distinguish between employ-
ment growth ambitions of male and female entrepreneurs,
institutions show remarkable results.
The interaction terms in Table 3 model III demon-
strate the aggregate effects of the moderator (i.e., male
entrepreneurship). Yet, to analyze the gender difference
(b) hypotheses more precisely, we look into interaction
plots (Appendix). The first plot shows that in countries
with extensive business freedom (i.e., values above 80),
there is no significant difference in male and female
entrepreneurs’ employment growth ambitions. Howev-
er, for moderate and low levels of business freedom (i.e.,
values equal or below 80), male entrepreneurs have a
significantly higher (yet decreasing) level of employ-
ment growth ambition than do female entrepreneurs.
This finding partially supports hypothesis 1b (except
for values above 80).
The second plot suggests that with higher levels of labor
freedom (i.e., values above 40), male entrepreneurs form
significantly higher employment growth ambitions than
female entrepreneurs. However, for low levels of labor
freedom (i.e., values equal to or lower than 40), the differ-
ence between male and female entrepreneurs is not signif-
icant. This finding is in line with hypothesis 2b.
Concerning monetary freedom, Table 3’s third plot shows
the difference between male and female entrepreneurs’
employment growth ambitions: only with high levels of
monetary freedom (i.e., values equal to 70 or higher), male
entrepreneurs have significantly higher employment
growth expectations than their female counterparts; with
monetary freedom values below 70, the difference be-
tween male and female is not significant. This finding
generally supports hypothesis 3b.
4.1 Additional robustness checks
To check the robustness of our results, we perform
several additional tests. First, when we add interaction
terms in a step-wise fashion, the main effects do not
change. Second, to rule out the possibility of omitted
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Table 1 Independent and control variable definition, measurement, source, and justification






A country’s freedom from the
burden of regulations on
starting, operating, and closing
business, given factors such as
time, cost and number of
procedures, and efficiency of
government in the regulatory
process
The score is based on 10 factors,
all weighted equally:
Starting a business: procedures
(number); starting a business:
time (days); starting a business:
cost (% income per capita);
starting a business: minimum
capital (% income per capita);
obtaining a license: procedures
(number); obtaining a license:
time (days); obtaining a license:
cost (% income per capita);
closing a business: time (years);
closing a business: cost (% of
estate); and closing a business:
recovery rate (cents on the dol-
lar)








A country’s freedom from legal
regulation on the labor market,
including those relating to
minimum wages, hiring and
firing, hours of work, and
severance requirements
Six quantitative factors equally
weighted at one-sixth:
Ratio of minimum wage to the
average value added per
worker; hindrance to hiring
additional workers; rigidity of
hours; difficulty of firing
redundant employees; legally
mandated notice period; and
mandatory severance pay


















A country’s freedom from price
controls, and includes a
measure of price stability. Both
inflation and price controls
distort market activity
The weighted average inflation
rate for the most recent 3 years
serves as the primary input into
an equation that generates the
base score for monetary
freedom.
The extent of price controls is then
assessed as a penalty of up to 20
points subtracted from the base
score
In order of priority: International
Monetary Fund (IMF),
International Financial Statistics
Online; IMF, World Economic
Outlook, 2012; Economist
Intelligence Unit, ViewsWire;








GDP per capita GDP per capita indicates a
country’s level of economic
development








GDP growth rate indicates
economic growth and the
creation of opportunities at the
macro-level
GDP growth rate WBDI Wong et al. (2005);
Autio and Fu
(2015)
Population Country population indicates size
and possibilities for innovation
and entrepreneurship at the
macro-level






Current firm size is an important
driver of firm growth and
survival.
Current venture size by number of










Formal education, as a proxy of
investment in human capital, is
a driver of entrepreneurs’
performance and success
Dummy: 1 if university education
and 0 otherwise
GEM Unger et al. (2011);
Estrin et al.
(2016)
Fear of failure Fear of failure, as a proxy of the
risk-taking attitude, is a driver
Dummy: 1 if yes and 0 if otherwise
response to “fear of failure
GEM
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variable bias at least to some extent (Boudreaux et al.
2019), we add several country- and individual-level
controls, in addition to industry dummies that might
influence results (Online Appendix, Table A2). At the
country-level, several formal institutional variables
(i.e., access to credit, corporate tax rate, collected
social security contributions, protection of property
rights), two culture variables (i.e., uncertainty avoid-
ance, collectivism), and several important socio-
economic (i.e., population growth, developing versus
developed, economy size (proxied by GDP), labor
with tertiary education, GDP per capita squared) in
line with prior studies (Levie and Autio 2011; Autio
et al. 2013; Efendic et al. 2015; Li et al. 2018). Since
our sample is only 68 countries, we add and replace
country-level control variables one-by-one, and the
results are consistent with our main findings. Third,
at the individual level, other relevant control variables
including perceived social status of the entrepreneur,
recent entrepreneurship experience, entrepreneurial
networks, and perception of entrepreneurial skills
(Koellinger et al. 2007; Ucbasaran et al. 2010; Estrin
et al. 2013) do not change results (Online Appendix,
Table A2 for more details).
Table 1 (continued)
Variable Definition/justification Measurement Sources of data Justification (prior
studies)
of entrepreneurs’ ambitions and
attitude toward growth







Men and women start
entrepreneurial activity at
different life stages










Table 2 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the individual- and country-level variables





2. Current number of created
jobs
5.29 40.31 − 0.45
3. Entrepreneurs’ university
education
0.42 0.49 0.04 0.02
4. Fear of failure 0.41 0.62 0.03 0.05 0.01
5. Age of entrepreneur 41.92 14.71 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.04
6. Gender of entrepreneur
(male)
0.54 0.45 0.08 − 0.01 0.03 − 0.06 − 0.01
Country-level variables
7. Lagged business freedom 66.37 14.91 − 0.08 − 0.04 0.19 0.01 0.20 0.02
8. Lagged labor freedom 62.73 15.70 0.10 0.05 0.11 − 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.33
9. Lagged monetary freedom 74.24 7.63 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.12 − 0.01 0.44 0.28
10. Population (log) 17.25 1.60 0.00 0.01 − 0.05 0.02 − 0.03 − 0.03 − 0.32 0.16 − 0.06
11. GDP per capita (log) 9.57 1.12 0.00 0.04 0.25 0.03 0.25 0.06 0.35 0.11 0.39 − 0.18
12. GDP growth rate 2.25 3.78 0.03 − 0.03 − 0.12 − 0.05 − 0.12 − 0.03 − 0.34 0.03 − 0.12 0.21 − 0.46
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5 Discussion
Our results support the conclusion that the efficiency of
macro-level government regulations influences both
male and female entrepreneurs’ micro-level employ-
ment growth ambitions. While business regulations
(e.g., starting, obtaining permissions, closing a business)
deter entry by less ambitious entrepreneurs, stringent
and inefficient labor and monetary regulations decrease
all entrepreneurs’ employment growth ambitions. Our
findings are, by and large, consistent with prior entre-
preneurship and institutional economics studies (Estrin
et al. 2013; Nikolaev et al. 2018; Chowdhury et al.
2019). Yet, our results suggest that institutions may
have diverging effects on subgroups of entrepreneurs
(i.e., ambitious versus less ambitious entrepreneurs, men
versus women entrepreneurs) since (high quality) insti-
tutions are not equally available to all economic agents
(Aparicio et al. 2016). Policy makers who set regula-
tions with the goal of protecting citizens (e.g., the un-
employed) unintentionally create a situation where
subgroups of entrepreneurs are advantaged (or disad-
vantaged) in terms of access to resources as well as
expected returns on their ventures (Baumol et al. 2007).
More specifically and considering the first indepen-
dent variable, i.e., business freedom, we find a signifi-
cant negative direct effect on entrepreneurs’ employ-
ment growth ambitions. Thus, there is evidence for the
importance of one-off entry costs imposed by regula-
tions on entrepreneurs, albeit in a cross-country perspec-
tive. This is in line with Darnihamedani et al.’s (2018)
country-level cross-sectional findings that reports mod-
erate effects of start-up costs as an important one-off
cost on innovative entrepreneurship in a country. While
there are changes in the levels of business freedom
across countries, one possible explanation is that one-
off entry costs may impose a selection effect on the type
of entrepreneurs entering the market in addition to other,
probably more long-term effects from, for example,
informal institutions such as norms and culture (Ahl
and Nelson 2015; Eesley 2016). However, our findings
show that for moderate and lower levels of business
Table 3 Employment growth ambitions of entrepreneurs (log-transformed)
Variables Model I Model II Model III
Individual level
Entrepreneur’s university education 0.195** (0.010) 0.193** (0.010) 0.192** (0.010)
Entrepreneur’s fear of failure − 0.036** (0.007) − 0.037** (0.007) − 0.037** (0.007)
Entrepreneur’s gender (male) 0.226** (0.009) 0.227** (0.010) 0.022 (0.104)
Entrepreneur’s age − 0.002 (0.002) − 0.003 (0.002) − 0.003 (0.002)
Age square − 0.00001 (0.00002) − 0.00001 (0.00002) − 0.00001 (0.00002)
Current number of created jobs 0.001** (0.0001) 0.001** (0.0001) 0.001** (0.0001)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country characteristics
GDP per capita (log) − 0.024 (0.020) − 0.025 (0.027) − 0.023 (0.027)
GDP growth rate − 0.008** (0.002) − 0.007** (0.002) − 0.007** (0.003)
Population (log) − 0.024 (0.020) − 0.023 (0.021) − 0.022 (0.021)
Lagged business freedom (H1a) − 0.002** (0.0008) 0.0003 (0.009)
Lagged labor freedom (H2a) 0.003** (0.0007) 0.0002 (0.0008)
Lagged monetary freedom (H3a) 0.005** (0.001) 0.003 (0.002)
Lagged business freedom * male entrepreneurship (H1b) − 0.003** (0.0007)
Lagged labor freedom * male entrepreneurship (H2b) 0.003** (0.0006)
Lagged monetary freedom* male entrepreneurship (H3b) 0.003* (0.001)
Number of countries 68 68 68
Number of entrepreneurs 47,386 47,386 47,386
Country-level ICC 0.076 0.078 0.079
LR tests ** ** **
*p < 0.05 and **p < 0.01 (standard beta coefficients and standard errors presented)
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freedom (i.e., values equal or below 80), male entrepre-
neurs have a significantly higher (yet decreasing) levels
of employment growth ambition than do female entrepre-
neurs. The decreasing aspect of male entrepreneurs’ em-
ployment growth ambitions is interesting to observe since,
with high levels of business freedom, there is little to no
significant gender gap in entrepreneurs’ employment
growth ambitions. Recent studies suggest that start-up ease
perceptions can influence the gender gap in entrepreneur-
ial entry (Tonoyan et al. 2020). High levels of business
freedom can influence the perception of straightforward
start-up procedures and low barriers for entry. This is
particularly important for female entrepreneurs due to their
lower expected returns on entrepreneurship and less access
to resources (Watson and Robinson 2003).
Taken together, our findings show the importance of
recurring costs imposed by regulations on male and
female entrepreneurs’ employment growth ambitions,
consistent with prior studies (Baumol et al. 2007;
Darnihamedani et al. 2018). We find that labor freedom
positively influences entrepreneurs’ employment
growth ambitions, particularly among males. The sec-
ond plot in Appendix (Fig. 1) shows that while both
male and female entrepreneurs’ employment growth
ambitions rise with higher levels of labor freedom, male
entrepreneurs’ employment growth ambitions rise more
sharply. These findings are in line with our argument
that labor freedom offers certain advantages for entre-
preneurs’ employment growth ambitions such as labor
mobility and lower labor costs (Siebert 1997; Holmlund
2014; Kuckertz et al. 2016). These advantages consid-
erably increase entrepreneurs’ access to resources and
expected returns on business growth that are important
determinants for growth and planning (Penrose 1959;
Autio and Acs 2010; Khaire 2010). That said, we argue
that male entrepreneurs are better positioned than female
entrepreneurs to benefit from the advantages of labor
freedom. As male entrepreneurs are driven more by
economic missions and monetary reasons than female
entrepreneurs (Sexton and Bowman-Upton 1990;
Verheul et al. 2005), males are more likely to have
venture ambitions and to engage with growth planning.
Among males, return on entrepreneurship plays a piv-
otal role in engagement in growth activities and for
assuming innovation and growth risks. Thus, if regula-
tions impose less recurring labor costs on entrepreneurs,
male entrepreneurs are more likely to be engaged with
growth and innovation (van Stel et al. 2007;
Darnihamedani et al. 2018). Male entrepreneurs have a
more extended network of managers, tech professionals,
and investors than female entrepreneurs (Verheul and
Thurik 2001; Devine et al. 2019). Such an extended
network, in environments characterized by high levels
of labor freedom, can help with hiring and retaining
talent, needed for growth, as well as with finding mon-
etary resources for acquiring human and non-human
capital. All of these factors lead to better growth pros-
pects and higher employment growth ambitions among
male entrepreneurs particularly when a country’s labor
regulations are flexible.
Monetary freedom results generally resemble labor
freedom and are in line with the recurring cost argument.
Here, we see that monetary freedom positively contributes
to employment growth ambitions, particularly for male
entrepreneurs who, in turn, can create or widen the gender
gap in a country’s growth-oriented entrepreneurship. There
are three specific reasons why male entrepreneurs are
better positioned than female entrepreneurs to take advan-
tage of monetary freedom: first, due tomale entrepreneurs’
growth appetite and economic missions, males deem ex-
pected returns on entrepreneurship more decisively than
their female counterparts (Verheul et al. 2005; Hechavarria
et al. 2019). High recurring costs imposed by inflation
(e.g., high prices of resources) and lack of access to sound
money lower male entrepreneurs’ expected returns and
may result in lower growth appetites. Secondly, a
country’s variability of inflation may impose additional
risks, particularly on male entrepreneurs. Since female
entrepreneurs are less prone to reckless and aggressive
decisions (Robinson and Watson 2003; Jennings and
Brush 2013), they are more able to cope with variability
of inflation and price fluctuations. Male entrepreneurs,
however, may find it more challenging to plan for growth
in times of volatile inflation and fluctuating prices as they
are less able to make a “realistic” judgment of their venture
potentials and needs (Jennings and Brush 2013). Lastly,
while male entrepreneurs rely on external financing such
as venture capital more than female entrepreneurs, access
to sound money persuades the (foreign direct) investments
into a country including venture capital investments
(Bjornskov and Foss 2010; Nikolaev et al. 2018). These
arguments show that recurring costs of inefficient regula-
tions have more detrimental effects on male entrepreneurs.
Our findings support the notion that the dynamics of
male versus female entrepreneurs’ employment growth
ambitions differ significantly. Our analysis across both
developed and developing countries reveals that female
entrepreneurs have lower growth appetite than their male
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counterparts. Extant entrepreneurship research largely
focuses on a few new fast-growing entrepreneurs and
their antecedents, growth processes, and influences at
firm and societal levels (Bradley and Klein 2016; Fisher
et al. 2017; Welter et al. 2017). Our results show that
female entrepreneurs have, ceteris paribus, lower employ-
ment growth ambitions possibly due to their lower
growth “possibilities” such as less access to human,
social, and financial capital than male entrepreneurs
(Alsos et al. 2006; Coleman and Robb 2012). Our argu-
ment is simply that, due to various reasons, it may also be
less “desirable” for female entrepreneurs to engage with
high employment growth ambitions along their journey.
The “desirability” and “possibility” aspects of growth
could be due to behavioral reasons such as socially driven
missions and a reached reference point (Tversky and
Kahneman 1992) or due to external factors such as fe-
male entrepreneurs’ difficulty in accessing resources.
6 Conclusions
Our study unpacks entrepreneurial activity by exploring
gender differences in entrepreneurs’ growth ambitions.
Despite the positive overall influence of regulatory effi-
ciency on entrepreneurship, the gap in employment
growth ambitions of female versus male entrepreneurs
persists particularly when labor and monetary freedom
are present. Interestingly, the gender gap is particularly
pronounced in countries with higher levels of regulatory
efficiency. Our analysis provides a basis for understand-
ing how the interplay of formal and informal institutions
creates an environment, even in countries with high-
quality institutions, that does not help (or provide very
little help) to close the gender gap in entrepreneurship.
By presenting our arguments and findings, we hope to
stimulate further inquiries into the linkages between
formal institutions, entrepreneurship policies, informal
institutions, and the entrepreneurial decisions and be-
havior of women and men. Below, we offer implica-
tions, limitations, and directions for future research.
6.1 Implications
To date, little scholarly attention has been devoted to the
influence of costs imposed by regulations on women
versus men entrepreneurship given the dearth of gender
and entrepreneurship studies that consider public policy
(Link and Strong 2016). Prior studies do not typically
consider regulations as sources of costs that may influ-
ence women entrepreneurs differently from men entre-
preneurs given their differences in the society. Prior
studies investigated the sources of women and men
entrepreneurs’ differences from the perspective of infor-
mal institutions such as dissimilar access to social cap-
ital, access to capital and social norms, and expectations
(Powell and Ansic 1997; Kanze et al. 2018; Tonoyan
et al. 2020). Yet, it has been unclear how the interplay of
such differences arising from informal institutions and
regulatory costs originating from formal institutions
shape women entrepreneurs’ growth ambitions. Our
study sheds light on this gap. Our main argument pre-
mised on the notion that male entrepreneurs are overall
better positioned than female entrepreneurs to benefit
from efficient regulations. In this context, the govern-
ment, through (re-)structuring the relative rewards for
entrepreneurship (Baumol 1990) in the society, can
stimulate ambitious entrepreneurship among females
by using appropriate business regulations.
Our findings suggest several policy implications as we
identify important differences between one-off costs (insti-
tutions of business freedom) and recurring costs (institu-
tions of labor and monetary) on growth ambitions of
women and men entrepreneurs. First and concerning
one-off entry costs stemming from (lack of) business
freedom, ambitious men entrepreneurs are more likely to
incur such costs to start their businesses than are ambitious
women entrepreneurs as a result of gender differences in
the society. Reducing one-off entry costs through business
freedom seems to lessen, and eventually close, the gender
gap in the sense that men entrepreneurs witness sharp
declines in growth ambitions but women entrepreneurs
only witness minor declines in growth ambitions (Appen-
dix Fig. 1). This finding suggests that policymakers should
carefully consider the consequences of higher levels of
business freedom in a country.
Second, both men and women entrepreneurs view
stringent labor and monetary regulations as recurring costs
that repeatedly reduce their incomes and limit their access
to resources (Baumol et al. 2007). These recurring costs
discourage both men and women entrepreneurs equally
from setting high growth ambitions in the market while
having more detrimental effects on men entrepreneurs. On
the other hand, when countries score high on labor and
monetary freedom, men entrepreneurs benefit
disproportionally, possibly due to their social capital as
well as their economic ambitions. Policy makers, while
advocating labor and monetary freedom, should design
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specific women’s entrepreneurship policies that systemat-
ically tackle such inequalities in a country. In many coun-
tries, women’s entrepreneurship policies can provide re-
sources much needed by ambitious women entrepreneurs,
e.g., in terms of subsidies, grants, networking events, and
education. While such policies help to reduce the gender
gap, they appear insufficient and slow to close the gender
gap in terms of the quality (or ambitions) of entrepreneurs.
One policy solution is encouraging women to enter more
into decision-making positions in entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems such as investment and advisory firms, accelerators,
and incubators (Brush et al. 2019; Sperber and Linder
2019). Such women decision-makers are more likely to
provide support and resources for survival and growth of
women entrepreneurs in the society.
Third, we suggest that policymakers support “enablers”
of women entrepreneurship in the society such as role
models and women institutional entrepreneurs (Garud
et al. 2007; Levie and Autio 2011). Female role models
and institutional entrepreneurs can, through a bottom-up
approach, not only contribute to transforming informal
institutions (i.e., existing norms and values), but also help
to adjust entrepreneurship policies so that such policies
provide more equal grounds for growth opportunities and
resources for women entrepreneurs. The female entrepre-
neurship literature acknowledges the need for a critical
mass of female players in traditionally male-dominated
positions to support women entrepreneurs to change
existing formal rules and informal norms and values
(Brush et al. 2009).
6.2 Limitations
Before concluding, we acknowledge several limitations.
First, the eight-year cross-sectional nature is certainly not
long enough to investigate the impact of institutional
development on entrepreneurs’ employment growth am-
bitions. A longitudinal study in which male and female
entrepreneurs may vary with institutional change in a
country can substantially help to derive causality (Smith
and Miner 1983; Lechner and Kreutzer 2010). The GEM
time horizon is still short to explore institutional changes
in a country (Estrin et al. 2013). Longer-term studies
show how pro-market reforms increase private firm per-
formance in developing countries (Lau 2012) and should
be explored using a larger GEM dataset. Although we
added several robustness checks to address endogeneity,
we can only partially address the timeline issue. Second,
there may be other moderators affecting the relationship
between efficient regulations and employment growth
ambitions. Future studies should explore individual char-
acteristics (e.g., entrepreneurs’ networks, human capital,
and fear of failure) and resource access (e.g., financial
resources). For example, venture capital financing may
influence employment growth ambitions as venture cap-
italists offer better linkages to financial capital and non-
financial resources (Aghion et al. 2007; Grilli and
Murtinu 2014). Future studies can investigate whether
government regulations influence growth ambitions of
female entrepreneurs who are backed by venture capital-
ists compared to those who are not since inefficient
regulations in the form of high recurring costs may more
severely impact non-venture-capital-backed female entre-
preneurs due to their limited access to resources (Cassar
2004; Darnihamedani et al. 2018).
6.3 Future research directions
In addition to the directions for future research derived
from our study’s limitations, we offer scholars other
promising lines of enquiry. First, future research could
explore growth in terms of international sales or other
dimensions of performance such as new product and
service development. We expect that such performance
criteria may also require constellations of greater eco-
nomic freedom. Second, scholars could look at the
dynamic coevolution process, treating certain regulatory
policy changes or monetary instability as an exogenous
shock, and then thoroughly investigating the linkages
between policies and outcomes. Scholars have begun to
examine individual country cases, for example, the his-
tory of innovation policy in Sweden (Karlson et al.
2020), but there is a need for detailed multi-country
research. The differences between developed and devel-
oping countries can be explored in this respect. Third,
scholars should explore subnational levels as some re-
gions may offer more favorable conditions to women
entrepreneurs due to policies or ecosystems. Fourth,
researchers could investigate how components of eco-
nomic freedom may disproportionately affect other sub-
groups of entrepreneurs such as immigrants and minor-
ities. Lastly, it is important to look into other relevant
formal institutions such as taxation and intellectual
property protection and their influence on women entre-
preneurs’ growth ambitions.
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Fig. 1 Plots of cross-level inter-
actions of regulatory efficiency
and entrepreneurship
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